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A. Theories of Recovery and Kinds of Losses
Last year's Annual Survey Article on Torts suggested that some of the
complexity in products liability law in Texas and other states is unneces-
sary in order to allocate the costs of losses between those who buy, use, and
are otherwise adversely affected by products, and those who make and sell
such products.' Much of the complexity can be eliminated by adopting,
through court decision and legislation, a single theory of recovery for each
particular kind of loss as opposed to permitting the plaintiff to rely on two
or three theories for the same loss.2 Since the Uniform Commercial Code
as adopted in Texas specifically provides for recovery on a warranty theory
for all losses proximately caused by a breach of warranty,3 the single the-
ory of recovery can only be accomplished by eliminating recovery against
a seller on a tort theory. Such a solution, however, is utterly unreasonable
when applied to personal injuries produced by dangerously defective prod-
ucts. Two decisions by the Texas Supreme Court, Mid Continent Aircraft
Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc.4 and Signal Oil & Gas Co. v.
Universal Oil Products,5 can help in identifying a single theory of recovery
for a particular kind of loss. While these two cases do not settle the law,
they do constitute a substantial step toward resolving the problem.6
In Mid Continent the plaintiff, an operator of a crop-spraying service,
purchased a used airplane from the defendant on an "as is" basis. Twenty-
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.J.D., Harvard University; LL.D., Southern
Methodist University. W. Page Keeton Professor of Law in Torts, University of Texas.
1. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1 (1978).
2. Recovery for losses resulting from defective products are allowed under negligence
in tort, strict liability in tort, and breach of warranty-contract theory.
3. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.714, .715(b)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
4. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
5. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
6. It should be admitted at the outset that the majority and dissenting opinions in these
cases reflect some understandable disagreement with some of the suggestions made in last
year's Annual Survey Article. Compare 572 S.W.2d at 312 (Daniel, J.) with id. at 316 (Pope,
J., dissenting). Both opinions focus on the distinction made in last year's Annual Survey.
A distinction should be made between the type of "dangerous condition"
that causes damage only to the product itself and the type that is dangerous to
other property or persons. A hazardous product that has harmed something
or someone can be labeled as part of the accident problem; tort law seeks to
protect against this type of harm through allocation of risk. In contrast, a
damaging event that harms only the product should be treated as irrelevant to
policy considerations directing liability placement in tort. Consequently, if a
defect causes damage limited solely to the property, recovery should be avail-
able, if at all, on a contract-warranty theory.
Keeton, supra note i, at 5 (emphasis added). Since it is always helpful to identify areas of
disagreement, an attempt will be made to state more clearly the holdings of the courts as
well as the comments made therefrom.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
one days later, and after thirty hours of engine time, the engine failed in
flight while the pilot was spraying a field. The pilot landed the aircraft on
a rough country road, damaging the fuselage and wings. Recovery ap-
peared to depend upon whether the defendant could disclaim strict liabil-
ity in tort and contract warranty with an "as is" disclaimer. The majority,
however, did not reach the disclaimer of strict liability in tort issue,7 stat-
ing that since the loss was an "economic loss to the purchased product
itself,"' the basis of recovery would be limited to a UCC warranty theory.9
This conforms to the suggestion made in last year's survey.'° Admittedly,
there is substantial diversity of opinion on this point throughout the coun-
try. For example, in the dissenting opinion in Mid Continent Justice Pope
perceptively observed that the single-theory approach to recovery es-
poused in last year's Annual Survey Article would have been better ac-
cepted if a reason had been given in support of its conclusion, especially in
view of the fact that the defect in the airplane was the kind that could have
endangered other things and people as well as the product itself."
In Signal an action was brought by Signal Oil and Gas Company to
recover damages to a reactor-charged heater, to the refinery surrounding
the heater, and to other nearby property, which resulted from an explosion
and fire caused by an alleged defect or defects in the heater. The primary
defendants were Procon, the contractor who constructed an isomax unit
and hydrogen plant into which the heater was installed, and Alcorn, the
manufacturer of the heater who sold the heater directly to Procon. Argua-
bly, a strict liability action against Procon should not have been available
because Procon constructed the isomax unit and hydrogen plant at Signal's
plant in Houston, thus possibly qualifying as an independent contractor.
An independent contractor who constructs a building on land owned by
the contractor's employer is normally not regarded as a seller of a product,
but is regarded as a provider of a service and is not subject to strict liability
in tort.' 2 On the other hand, in Texas and other states one who sells homes
on property he owns and develops is subject to either strict liability in tort
or breach of an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of such
homes' 3 in much the same way as a manufacturer of goods. The technical
distinction between an independent contractor who builds a house on land
7. The Amarillo court of civil appeals held that an "as is" disclaimer did not absolve a
seller of strict tort liability. 553 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977), rev'don other
grounds, 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978); see Keeton, supra note I, at 8-9.
8. 572 S.W.2d at 312.
9. Id at 313.
10. See note 6 supra.
i. 572 S.W.2d at 316-17 (Pope, J., dissenting).
12. See Lotten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968). See generally W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 104, at 680-82 (4th ed. 1971) (liability for negligence
only); Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 792 (1975) (contractor liability for latent defects in product used);
Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969) (liability of builder-vendor of new home for loss from defec-
tive condition); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 865 (1958) (contractor's negligence to third persons
injured or damaged after acceptance of work). But see Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484
P.2d 573 (197 1) (contractor held strictly liable for defectively installing water heater).
13. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Humber v.
Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
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owned by his employer and one who sells homes on property he owns and
develops may not justify a distinction in liability for losses due to defective
conditions arising from the construction process or the products installed
in the building. In any event, the majority in Signal seemed to rely on the
fact that under the contract title did not pass from Procon until construc-
tion was completed. 4 As a result, Procon was regarded as a seller of the
isomax unit and the hydrogen plant. 5 The other defendant, Alcorn, was
also a seller, but only of the heater, a component part of the refinery that
was to be constructed. In other words, the suit was against both an assem-
bler-contractor and a component part manufacturer for physical harm to
the component itself, to the assembled product, and to other property. The
jury found total property damage to be approximately $378,000, whereas
the cost of the defective heater itself was only about $196,000.16 The ma-
jority regarded the physical damage to the refinery as damage to property
other than the product itself, the heater, and concluded that the existence
of such collateral property damage, in addition to the damage to the prod-
uct itself, authorized recovery for such damages on a strict tort theory as
well as on a warranty theory.' 7 The majority stated: "To the extent that
the product itself has become part of the accident risk or the tort by caus-
ing collateral property damage, it is properly considered as part of the
property damages, rather than as economic loss.' ' 8
In summary, the following propositions can be derived from the major-
ity opinion: (1) the heater was the defective product; (2) the collateral dam-
age to the refinery, of which the heater was a component part, was caused
by the defective heater; and (3) when property other than the defective
product itself suffers physical harm, all of the damages resulting from the
accident are recoverable on a strict tort liability theory as well as on a
warranty theory.
The contrast in issues in the majority and dissenting opinions in Signal
and Mid Continent provide a useful basis for a second attempt to propose
the adoption of a single theory of recovery for a particular kind of loss
resulting from a defective product. Such a-theory is valuable for two rea-
sons. First, it would simplify this complex area of tort law. Secondly,
there are a variety of issues that ought not to and often cannot be answered
in the same way with respect to all kinds of losses. Four of the most im-
portant of these issues are: (1) the condition of a product that will serve as
a basis for finding that the product is defective or unfit; (2) the class of
persons, if any, other than the purchaser who can recover for a particular
kind of loss; (3) the validity of an agreement by the purchaser and the
seller to alter the obligations that would otherwise be imposed on the seller
14. 572 S.W.2d at 331. "Procon functioned as the assembler of the component parts
into a final completed product, the isomax unit and hydrogen plant. Procon maintained title
in such product until it was sold to Signal by a bill of sale." Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 325 n.7.




by including in the contract (a) disclaimers of warranties, (b) limitations
on remedies, or (c) limitations on the duration of a warranty; and (4) de-
fenses and other roadblocks to recovery attributable to the conduct of the
purchaser, the user of the defective product, the user of a different product,
or the victim. The rules relating to the dual remedies of rescission and
damages when intangible economic losses are suffered as a consequence of
a breach of warranty are set forth in some detail in the UCC. 9 It is quite
clear that the economic and policy considerations reflected in the Code's
allocation of risks between buyers and sellers of goods are not the same as
the considerations related to the resolution of personal injury claims. The
legislative resolution of economic loss allocation in the Code should not be
circumvented. The notion that the legislature has not provided the exclu-
sive remedy cannot be rationally justified, either constitutionally or as a
matter of interpretation.
For present purposes, defective product losses can be categorized into
four areas. These areas are personal injuries, intangible economic losses
attributable neither to personal injuries nor to physical damage to the
product itself or other property, physical damage to property other than
the defective product itself, and physical damage to the defective product
itself.2°
Personal Injuries. The development of strict liability in tort for defective
products was inspired by the astronomical costs of treating persons injured
or killed by defective products. In 1960 the decision in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.2" first developed the premise that costs arising
from dangerously defective products should be borne by those in the busi-
ness of making and selling such products. Generally, this enterprise liabil-
ity has been justified on three grounds: (1) the seller is in a position to
avoid the costs of accidents by the institution of safer practices and proce-
dures;22 (2) proof of negligence or fault in the design or manufacture of a
defective product is difficult to achieve;2 3 and (3) typically, the maker or
other seller-defendant is in a position to escape such costs by shifting them
to the consuming public as a cost of doing business.2 4 Moreover, in an
action to recover damages as resulting from a dangerously defective prod-
19. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.711-.719 (Tex UCC) (Vernon 1968). For vary-
ing interpretations of a buyer's right to rescind contracts for goods that do not conform to
consumer expectations, see La Villa Fair v. Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 548 P.2d
825, 831-33 (1976); Clark v. Zaid, Inc., 263 Md. 127, 282 A.2d 483 (1971); Zabriskie Chevro-
let, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195, 200-05 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968).
20. In last year's Survey Article seven categories were listed. Keeton, supra note 1, at 2-
6. The list was unnecessarily complex, however, and, on further reflection, I believe only
these four categories are needed for clear analysis.
21. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).22. Keeton, Products Liability--Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1019, 1119 (1960).
23. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965). See also Kee-
ton, supra note 22; Prosser, supra note 22.
[Vol. 33
TORTS
uct, answers to important issues such as standing to recover, availability of
defenses, and validity of disclaimers cannot be properly resolved in the
context of commercial law rules. This notion is probably true even as to
personal injuries of the purchaser himself, although historically, a party to
a contract could agree to a disclaimer of tort liability that would otherwise
be imposed in many situations.25 Such contractual disclaimer of tort lia-
bility, however, probably should not be tolerated in the products liability
area. In any event the problem should be dealt with in the context of a set
of rules quite unlike those applicable in some instances to the commercial
law of sales. In fact, the Joint Committee on the Study of Products Liabil-
ity of the Texas House of Representatives, in a preliminary report, recom-
mended legislation that would remove any recovery for damages due to
physical harm to the person or property other than the defective product
itself from coverage by the Business and Commercial Code.2 6 Only legis-
lative action can limit recovery for personal injury losses to a single theory
based upon tort.
Intangible Economic Losses. The appropriate theory of recovery for intan-
gible economic losses was discussed in last year's Annual Survey.27 In the
1977 case of Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers28 the Texas Supreme Court
held that intangible economic losses resulting from defective products are
recoverable only under a breach of warranty action under the UCC.2 9
Notwithstanding some authority to the contrary,30 this seems to be the
generally accepted position in most jurisdictions. Legislation such as the
UCC, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act of 1974,"' and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 32
demonstrates a legislative attempt to provide the exclusive remedy for eco-
nomic losses. These legislative enactments ought to be the controlling
remedy for economic losses. The creation of a judicial tort theory, either
negligence or strict liability, to correct what is conceived to be an inade-
quate or improper legislative action, is not the appropriate solution.
Physical Harm to Property Other than the Defective Product Itself Courts
have begun to distinguish between a claim for damages resulting from
physical harm to property and a claim for damages resulting from personal
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965) and comments following.
See also Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974)
(clearly drawn disclaimer of tort liability will be upheld if parties are both enterprisers).
26. TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 65TH LEGISLATURE, JOINT COMMITTEE
STUDY ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 13-14, 80 (1978).
27. Keeton, supra note 1, at 6-8.
28. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
29. Id at 80.
30. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 311-13
(1965); Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414,
426-28 (1973).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
32. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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injuries.33 Prior to the development of strict liability in tort, it was clear
that a seller of a defective product was subject to two theories of liability: a
negligence theory for physical harm both to property of strangers to the
contract and to property of the purchaser other than the product itself,34
and a warranty theory for damage to other property of the purchaser as
consequential damages.35 Noting these two avenues of recovery, one jus-
tice stated in Brown v. Western Farmers Association36 that if he were writ-
ing on a clean slate, he would limit the application of strict liability in tort
to injuries to the person, because it was the "human carnage caused by
defectively dangerous products" 37 that brought about strict liability in tort.
The Nebraska Supreme Court restricted strict liability to personal injuries
in Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co.38 As one justice observed in
that case, the owner of tangible personal property usually protects himself
against most accidental losses through first party insurance, 39 as no doubt
the plaintiffs did in Mid Continent and in Signal. Thus, there is very little
social utility in transferring accident costs from one insurance company to
another insurance company, thereby adding litigation fees to the total costs
of insurance.4° It seems clear that the admonitory function of tort law in
this area can be adequately served by limiting the plaintiffs theory of re-
covery to strict liability for personal injuries and to negligence liability for
property damages.
First party insurance coverage of the type contemplated by the Ne-
braska justice, however, would often not extend to all kinds of accidents
caused by the defective product. Even assuming broad insurance cover-
age, the amount of coverage may be for less than the full value of the
damaged or destroyed product. A tort theory based on either negligence
or strict liability is necessary to allow recovery by strangers to the contract,
and in such cases the property damage recovery would often only be inci-
dental to the primary recovery of damages for personal injuries. Conse-
quently, strangers to the contract should not be required to prove
negligence as a basis for recovery for property damage, but only to prove a
product defect.
It would at first appear reasonable to require that economic losses of the
33. Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643, 652-54
(1973); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 318, 405 P.2d 502, 503-04 (1965) (Holman, J., concur-
ring).
34. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958) (cinder blocks caused damage to a cottage built of such blocks); Ebers v. General
Chem. Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945) (damage to fruit trees caused by an emul-
sion used to kill borers).35. So long as consequential damages proximately result from a breach of warranty,
recovery is available under § 2-715(b) (2) of the UCC.
36. 268 Ore. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974) (Holman, J., dissenting).
37. 521 P.2d at 544.
38. 199 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
39. 209 N.W.2d at 658 (Clinton, J., concurring).
40. Id at 658-59. See also Wulff v. Sprouse, 262 Ore. 293, 498 P.2d 766 (1972) (insur-
ance company joined with a homeowner in bringing suit for damages to home and contents
caused by defective electric blanket).
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buyer attributable to any kind of property damage be recoverable pursuant
to sales or commercial law. A buyer that agrees to some kind of a dis-
claimer or "as is" transaction, however, does not ordinarily contemplate
how costs should be allocated if an accident results from a dangerous con-
dition of the product that physically harms something other than the prod-
uct itself. As stated earlier, a Texas legislative committee has
recommended excluding from the kinds of consequential damages recov-
erable under the UCC any physical harm to property other than damages
to the defective product itself.4
Physical Damage to the Defective Product Itself. It has occasionally been
held that if a dangerously defective product causes an accident, then any
loss resulting from that accident, including damage to the product itself,
should be recoverable on a theory of strict liability in tort.4 2 Justice Pope
argued for such a theory in his dissent in Mid Continent43 and in his con-
currence in Signal." Although this is a reasonable position, the risk of
harm to the product itself due to the condition of the product is something
that should be left to the parties to negotiate, especially if the parties are
sophisticated. Quite correctly, however, a distinction is currently made in
the law between consumer and nonconsumer transactions. The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act substantially restricts freedom of contract
in consumer transactions.45 Nevertheless, the law of sales should control
whether a buyer may recover for any defect in the purchased product that
results in depreciation in the value of that product. The policy considera-
tions justifying the imposition of strict liability, irrespective of the contract,
on those who sell dangerously defective products can be adequately fos-
tered by imposing liability for personal injuries and other property dam-
age.
Other reasons support the position that the law of sales and not the law
of torts ought to control damage to the product itself. When damage is
limited to the product itself, it may be difficult to determine whether the
damage is attributable to a so-called accident. Distinguishing "accidental"
damage to the product from mere economic loss is difficult in many cases,
such as a defect in a component of a television set that burns out the tubes,
or an electrical connection to the engine of a refrigerator that destroys the
engine. If the theory of recovery is made to depend on the existence of an
accident, liability for this kind of loss would be based upon an irrelevant
issue, that is, whether the damage was due to a sudden calamitous event.46
41. TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 26.
42. See, e.g., Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alas. 1977); Mike Bajalia, Inc. v.
Amos Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664 (1977).
43. Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d
308, 313-20 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J., dissenting).
44. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 331-33 (Tex. 1978)
(Pope, J., concurring).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
46. For an example of a court making such a finding, see Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563
P.2d 248, 251 (Alas. 1977).
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In any event the "accident" distinction is questionable since tort liability
for personal injuries for defective products does not depend on the hap-
pening of such an event. It can, however, be imposed for an occupational
disease or other disease to persons or animals that is contracted as a conse-
quence of a protracted use of drugs and other chemical products.47
It is possible to distinguish defectively dangerous products from
nondangerous, inferior products. If, however, a dangerous defect is dis-
covered before an accident occurs and is repaired by the purchaser, the
right to recover for that loss should depend upon the available contractual
remedies, including warranties, just as recovery would be limited to the
contract when the buyer must repair a product that is unsuitable for some
reason unrelated to a risk of physical harm to person or property.48
In Mid Continent an airplane was sold to the plaintiff on an "as is" basis.
Consequently, if any part or component of the assembled airplane, albeit
made by another, was defective, the defect could be said to have caused
harm to the product itself. It is not difficult to identify what the defendant
sold, and what the bargain was between the sophisticated parties. If the
plaintiff did not have the airplane insured against loss, then it was a valid
business decision to be a self-insurer. Denial of recovery because of the
disclaimer of warranty is not unfair in such a case.
In Signal the court seemed to hold that if the product caused an accident
that harmed property other than the defective product itself, then all prop-
erty damages would be recoverable on a strict tort theory as well as a war-
ranty theory. In so holding reliance was placed on an ambiguous
comment by the author in last year's Survey Article.49 But the court's
statement in Signal and the author's comment last year are ambiguous and
unclear in more than one respect. Arguably, the theory upon which a re-
covery is available for a loss should depend entirely on the type of loss,
and not on whether some other type of loss was also suffered. I would
agree with the proposition in the dissenting opinion in Mid Continent: the
theory of recovery for damage to the airplane should not depend upon
whether physical injury to a person or damage to other property also re-
sulted from the airplane crash." Thus, if a defectively dangerous car
47. See Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbesto-
sis from working with asbestos products); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 169 (Fla.
1963) (lung cancer from smoking cigarettes).
48. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148
N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), a fdmem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956), in which a
purchaser who spent considerable sums repairing allegedly dangerously defective airplane
engines was denied recovery from the manufacturer because of lack of privity. In discussing
the effects of a contrary result, the court stated:
Manufacturers would be subject to indiscriminate lawsuits by persons having
no contractual relations with them, persons who could thereby escape the limi-
tations, if any, agreed upon in their contract of purchase. Damages for inferior
quality, per se, should better be left to suits between vendors and purchasers
since they depend on the terms of the bargain between them.
148 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (emphasis added).
49. See note 6 supra.
50. 572 S.W.2d 308, 317 (Pope, J., dissenting).
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causes a collision that destroys itself and another car, recovery for damages
to the nondefective car would be based on a tort theory, while damages to
the defective car would be based on a warranty theory.
In Signal the contractor, Procon, sold the refinery. The other defendant,
Alcorn, sold the heater, the component part. For the reasons just outlined,
the seller of an assembled product should not be liable for harm to the
product itself except on a warranty contract theory. But what about the
liability of the seller of the component part? Arguably again, one who sells
a product that is not to be used "as is" but as a component part of a prod-
uct to be assembled by the purchaser, ought not to be subject to liability on
any different theory than that on which the assembler is held liable. This
is because the ultimate purchaser who incurred a loss purchased the as-
sembled product, and the harm is, therefore, harm to the defective product
itself. Hence, under this analysis harm to the refinery is harm to the prod-
uct itself.
B. The Seller's Liabilityfor Physical Injury and the Meaning of Defect
No issue has produced more diversity of opinion and outright misunder-
standing as the meaning of defect when that term is used in relation to
design hazards. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts pro-
vides that one who sells a product "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous . . . is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused."'
This simply means that the defect must subject users or others to an unrea-
sonable risk of physical harm. The commentary goes on to say that to be
unreasonably dangerous "[tihe article sold must be dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics. 52
One of the difficulties with the law of products liability is that many
advocates and courts have accepted section 402A and the commentary-
much of the latter of which is inconsistent with the law as it has devel-
oped-as the black letter law. In fact, when the comments were written,
most of the issues had not even been raised. Only subsequent litigation
and the adversary system could adequately raise these issues.
The test as set forth in the comments to section 402A reflects the com-
mercial law origins of strict liability and is therefore inappropriate as a test
for identifying a defectively dangerous design hazard. This is true for sev-
eral reasons. First, the mere fact that a drug or some other product has a
risk or hazard related to its use that neither the seller nor the purchaser or
other user contemplated should not ipso facto result in a finding that the
product as formulated is defective. It could be that the drug is of great
benefit to modem science and the harmful side effects minimal compared
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
52. Id., Comment i.
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with the benefits. 53
Secondly, the mere fact that a product is not more dangerous than
would be contemplated does not of itself require a finding that it was a
nondefective product. Such a requirement would mean that a plaintiff
would never be able to recover for harm resulting from an obvious haz-
ard.5 4 Moreover, industry practices would control how safely products
should be designed since that is all that consumers would expect. 55
Thirdly, the standard found in section 402A and its commentary is
vague and impractical. It has often been applied when the ordinary pur-
chaser would not have considered certain performance characteristics of
the product. For example, the ordinary automobile purchaser may not
consider the possibility of the car catching fire after a collision, or the pos-
sibility of a side window of a car shattering and injuring the passengers.5 6
Regardless of these criticisms, the section 402A test or a facsimile
thereof has been used frequently by trial judges in Texas in total disregard
of what the Texas Supreme Court suggested in Henderson v. Ford Motor
Co.57 According to Henderson, a product is defectively designed if the
product is unreasonably dangerous. A product is unreasonably dangerous
if either: (1) it is so likely to be harmful to persons or property that a rea-
sonable, prudent manufacturer who had actual knowledge of its harmful
character would not place it on the market, or (2) it is dangerous to an
extent that it "would not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer as to its safety." 58
This approach seems to employ a bifurcated test similar to one adopted
by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Tull Engineering Co.59 It is
clear from a reading of Henderson that both tests involve a weighing of
risks against utility, one from the viewpoint of a seller knowing the dan-
gers, and the other from the viewpoint of a consumer knowing the dangers.
In reality, the tests are one and the same because the "reasonable person"
will arrive at the same conclusion as to whether the danger is or is not
unreasonable when cast in the role of either a seller or a buyer.
53. Cf. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960) (recovery allowed for damaging virus in polio vaccine; breach of warranty theory).
54. For cases allowing recovery for obvious hazards, see Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2
Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3
Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970). Contra, Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305
N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
55. This would make defects harder to prove than negligence since, in negligence cases,
custom is not controlling. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 33, at 166-68.
56. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977) (shattered win-
dow case not applying test for defect).
57. 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
58. Id at 92 (emphasis added).
59. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). Using the Barker test, a
product is defectively designed in a particular way if the plaintiff proves either that it "failed
to perform as safely as the ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner," or that the design in some particular respect proximately
caused injury and the defendantfails toprove, "in the light of relevant factors, that, on bal-
ance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
design." Id at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
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The Supreme Court of Oregon recognized this similarity in Phillps v.
Kim wood Machine Co.6° The product in that case was a sanding machine
that had no protective guards. As a result, it was alleged to be defective
since it "could not be operated in the manner and for the purpose for
which it was manufactured and sold without throwing back towards the
operator panels of materials being sanded."'" The court considered
whether a seller-oriented standard or a user-oriented standard would be
more appropriate, and concluded that the two standards would be the
same because a reasonable seller would be selling the same product that a
reasonable buyer would believe that he was entitled to have.62 This of
course makes sense only if we presume knowledge of the danger on the
part of both the seller and the consumer, leaving the issue of product de-
fect to turn on the reasonableness of exposing users and others to such
danger.
Three cases were decided during the survey period that seem to confirm
the existence of a single test, two by the Texas Supreme Court and one by
the Beaumont court of civil appeals in which the Texas Supreme Court has
granted writ. In Miller v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. 63 the eleven-year-old
plaintiff had his left arm severed at the shoulder when it was caught in a
centrifugal extractor clothes dryer that was being used at a laundromat.
The extractor was equipped with a safety device to prevent the lid from
opening while the basket was still spinning. After eighteen years of use the
dryer lid safety device failed to work. The expert evidence indicated that
the failure occurred because one of the rubber pads on which the operating
mechanism rested had deteriorated. The instruction manual indicated that
this should be expected.64 The court relied heavily on expert testimony
clearly indicating that when the dryer was built an economically feasible
design existed that would have eliminated this danger altogether, without
relying on users for proper maintenance.65 In concluding that the evidence
in the record justified a jury finding of defect, the court set forth the Hen-
derson bifurcated test.66
In Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.67 the plaintiff sued the manufac-
turer of a Traxcavator, a tractor-type machine designed to operate prima-
rily as a front-end loading machine in muddy conditions in which wheeled
vehicles would not be suitable. A step mounted on the side of the Trax-
cavator was used to enter and leave the vehicle's cabin. The plaintiff suf-
fered injuries when he fell from the step, which he claimed was defectively
designed. The trial court submitted the issue of defective design of the step
60. 269 Ore. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
61. 525 P.2d at 1034.
62. Id at 1036-37.
63. 568 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1977).
64. Id. at 655 (Daniel, J., dissenting on rehearing).
65. Id. at 651. The evidence indicated that using pads made of nondeteriorating mater-
ials would have eliminated the danger without affecting the usefulness or serviceability of
the product.
66. Id. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
67. 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978).
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in terms of the section 402A "ordinary user's contemplation" test, and the
jury found for the plaintiff. The court of civil appeals held that there was
no evidence to support the finding,6" citing with approval69 an article by
Profe~sor James A. Henderson.7" The article takes the position that the
conscious design choices of product manufacturers should not be evalu-
ated by courts and juries, contending that in the area of design defect
courts are incapable of deciding the complicated polycentric issues in-
volved in the weighing of many relevant factors.7 The court of civil ap-
peals observed that both the section 402A charge to the jury and the
supreme court bifurcated test for design defect are inexplicably being
transformed into a balancing test that weighs the risk of harm against the
utility of the product.72 This is an understandable and reasonable criti-
cism. The court further stated:
Without equating voluntary assumption of the risk with strict liability,
some matters usually associated with that defense become of primary
importance in disposing of the threshold question of the manufac-
turer's liability. . . . Any minimal danger presented by reason of the
design of the step was open, obvious, and objectively chargeable to
the Plaintiff.
73
The supreme court reversed,' 4 holding that the obvious nature of the dan-
ger did not alter the fact that it was technically and economically feasible
to design a safer system. Although the supreme court did not specifically
address the issues raised by the court of civil appeals, the supreme court
opinion indicates that the ordinary purchaser or user contemplation test
involves balancing risk against utility just as a seller-oriented test does, and
that such a balancing test is the only way to determine whether a design
hazard makes the product defective.
Before discussing General Motors Corp. v. Turner,75 the third case de-
cided during the survey period that addresses the test for determining a
design defect, it might be advantageous to propose a possible jury charge
on the issue of defective design that would seem to conform to the results
of cases recently decided by the supreme court. It is as follows:
68. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Gonzales, 562 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1977), rev'd, 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978).
69. 562 S.W.2d at 580.
70. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices.- The Limits
ofAdudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
71. The court in General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1978, writ granted), seemed to express agreement with similar sentiments
voiced by Jeffery O'Connell in O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299,
375 (1963).
72. 562 S.W.2d at 578. See also, Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
L.J. 5, 17 (1965), in which the author lists factors that should be considered in balancing the
utility of the product against the magnitude of the risk.
73. 562 S.W.2d at 579.
74. 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978).
75. 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ granted). The supreme
court has granted a writ of error in Turner and oral arguments have already been heard. It
is hoped that the ambiguities discussed herein will be resolved.
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A product is defective as designed in a particular aspect if the prod-
uct as so designed is unreasonably dangerous.
The product is unreasonably dangerous as so designed if- even
though at the time of sale ordinary care was exercised in providing
warnings and instructions about any danger that was known or should
have been known in the exercise of ordinary care-a reasonable per-
son would conclude that the magnitude of the danger in fact, as it is
proved to be at the trial, from intended and reasonably foreseeable
uses, outweighs its utility or usefulness.
[The magnitude of the danger as so designed is affected by such
matters as the degree of likelihood of injury producing accidents from
misuse and unintended uses as well as from intended and proper uses,
the seriousness of the harm that is likely to result when an accident
does occur, and the obvious nature of the danger and therefore the
avoidability of some or all of the harm by proper use.
The utility or usefulness of the product as so designed is affected by
such matters as the importance of the need that is served by the prod-
uct, the technical and economic feasibility or practicability of serving
that need with a safer design, and the availability of other products, if
any, serving that need about as well with greater safety.]
This is simply an elaboration of a test previously proposed76 and seem-
ingly approved in the dissenting opinion in Henderson.7 7 The proposed
charge dispenses with language about either consumers or sellers, and it
directly states that the test requires a balancing of danger against utility.
In the design area litigants should be required to put into issue the prob-
lem of weighing danger against usefulness in deciding when the threatened
danger exposes persons or property to an unreasonable risk of harm. This
does not mean, however, that it is irrelevant that a product fails to conform
to usual expectations. If the product fails to conform to usual consumer
expectations, perhaps the manufacturer should not have the burden of
coming forward with evidence to justify this failure; otherwise the infer-
ence can be drawn that the danger outweighs the benefits.
Some reservation must be expressed as to the usefulness of the danger
and utility definitions, which appear in brackets in the proposed charge.
Even after discussions with leading advocates, I remain uncertain as to
whether an attempt to instruct the jury on the various factors related to
danger and utility will be on the whole helpful or merely confusing. Such
an instruction could also be considered a comment on the weight of the
evidence,78 but that is a technical argument with which I am not in sympa-
76. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-38
(1973), in which the author states:
A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed. It is un-
reasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the magni-
tude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of
trial outweighs the benefits of the way the product was so designed and mar-
keted.
77. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974), stating: "Dean Keeton's
definition of what constitutes an unreasonably dangerous product fits the instant case pre-
cisely." Id. at 97 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing Keeton, supra note 76, at 37-38).
78. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
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thy if such a charge would be helpful to the jury and fairly presents the
interests to be weighed.
In General Motors Corp. v. Turner79 a motorist was injured when the
roof of his car collapsed in a rollover, placing the crashworthiness of the
vehicle in issue. Pursuant to the trial judge's charge, which used the sec-
tion 402A consumer contemplation test,80 the jury found that the car was
defective as designed. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial
court's charge to the jury was error because it failed to employ a balancing
test in instructing the jury on the definition of "unreasonably dangerous."
The court of civil appeals agreed. The opinion stated that under the
supreme court's rulings in Henderson8 and General Motors Corp. v. Hop-
kins8 2 a balancing test is not required as part of the instructions to the jury
when the defect is the producing cause of the accident, 3 but is required
when the defect merely aggravates the injuries.84
The court's opinion indicates that the jury should be instructed to bal-
ance the following factors to determine whether a design for crashworthi-
ness is defective:
(1) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole
weighed against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use; (2)
the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive; (3) the manufac-
turer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its costs;
(4) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of
the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable
warnings or instructions. 5
This approach has several flaws. In the first place, I can perceive no
reason for distinguishing between design hazards that cause accidents and
those that merely aggravate injuries received in accidents caused in other
ways. Moreover, item (1), when properly stated, should be the whole test
and not simply a factor. The question is whether the danger outweighs the
utility of the product, and that judgment is to be made by the jury, except
when there could be no reasonable difference of opinion as to whether a
reasonable person would conclude that the danger in fact outweighs the
utility.
The Turner opinion illustrates the danger in charging the jury on all the
79. 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ granted).
80. Id at 815 n.2. The court instructed the jury that " '[u]nreasonably dangerous'
means dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics." Id.
81. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Henderson.
82. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). In Hopkins the court approved the alternative test used
in Henderson. Id. at 347 n.1. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the test employed in Henderson.
83. 567 S.W.2d at 816.
84. Id.
85. Id at 818 (footnote omitted).
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considerations that are relevant in any given case. It may be better to al-
low advocates the freedom to illuminate the danger-utility test through the
particular facts at hand rather than attempt a stereotyped list of factors to
be used in all cases. A carefully worded explanation, however, such as the
one set out in the suggested charge, would contribute to the jury's under-
standing of the problem.
Addendum
On March 21, 1979, the supreme court affirmed the decision of the court
of civil appeals in Turner by way of remanding the case to the trial court.86
In doing so, however, disapproval was expressed of much of what was said
in the opinion of the court of civil appeals. The court concludes that:
(1) By the term "defectively designed" is meant a design that is "un-
reasonably dangerous";
(2) Unreasonably dangerous is a concept that necessarily implies a bal-
ancing of the danger in fact of a design against its utility. This therefore
becomes important on the kinds of evidence that will be admissible, on the
sufficiency of the evidence to justify a finding of defect, and on the nature
of the arguments that can be made to the jury;
(3) The bifurcated test for submission of the issue of design defect to
the jury as set forth in Henderson will no longer be applicable;
(4) A definition of "unreasonably dangerous" will no longer be re-
quired [or permitted] in the submission of a case to the jury. The jury is
not to be instructed even about the necessity for weighing danger against
utility;
(5) In deciding when a design is defective no distinction is to be made
between design hazards that cause accidents and those that merely aggra-
vate injuries received in accidents caused in other ways.
II. OCCUPIERS OF LAND
In the 1975 case of Farley v. MM Cattle Co.87 the Texas Supreme Court
abolished voluntary assumption of the risk as a defense against claims
seeking recovery on a theory of negligence.88 The court, however, did not
rule out altogether the notion that a person may sometime be entitled only
to information about a certain danger inherent in a course of action he is
about to undertake."9 If the person is informed of the risks involved, his
insistence on proceeding constitutes a bar to recovery; the defendant is not
guilty of any breach of duty to such a person. The court in Farley, in other
words, did not abolish the rule that a defendant can defend an action by
86. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 272 (March 21, 1979).
87. 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975).
88. This holding was forecast in Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.
1975), in which an invitee slipped and fell on a wet floor in the defendant's store.
89. The court stated that its decision would not affect the use of the voluntary assump-
tion of risk defense "in strict liability cases in which there is a knowing and express oral or
written consent to the dangerous activity or condition." 529 S.W.2d at 758.
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proving that he gave the plaintiff adequate warning of risks or hazards not
otherwise appreciated by the plaintiff. Still, the abolition of voluntary as-
sumption of risk as a defense demonstrates the court's inclination to find
that, normally, a victim's willingness to encounter a danger resulting from
the negligence of the defendant should not have any effect on recovery.
Hence, it was predictable that the same considerations that led to the
abolition of the assumed risk defense9° would also lead to the abolition of
any rule that allowed an occupier of land to give an invitee no more than
an adequate warning when the danger was not otherwise obvious. In
Parker v. Highland Park, Inc. 91 the supreme court held that the no-duty
rule is no longer available when injuries to invitees result from obvious
dangers on defendant's land.92 In Parker the plaintiff was the guest of an
apartment complex occupant and was injured when descending a dark-
ened stairway. The suit was against the owner-lessor of the complex who
was in occupancy and control of the stairway. As the court noted, the
award of damages could have been based on a narrow ruling that the
plaintiff as a guest of the tenant had a right to come on the premises with-
out having the permission of the defendant-owner of the complex. In-
stead, the court chose to adopt the broad rule that hereafter all premises
cases involving injuries to invitees would be tried on the issues of defend-
ant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence. Consequently, the
obviousness of the dangerous condition that results in an accident is a fac-
tor that has a bearing on both defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's
contributory negligence, since an accident resulting from an obvious dan-
ger is one that normally can be avoided. It shall not be conclusive, how-
ever, that either the defendant exercised ordinary care in the protection of
others or that the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care in his own
behalf.
The opinion emphasized that the case did not involve the liability of an
occupier to either a licensee or a trespasser.93 As to the duty owed to a
licensee, the supreme court in 1976 in Lower Neches Valley Authority v.
Murphy 94 held that a defendant-occupier would not be liable if the dan-
ger was as obvious to the licensee as it was to the occupier, or if the occu-
pier warned the licensee so as to make him aware of the danger. Thus, a
defendant's duty of care to some persons under certain circumstances may,
notwithstanding Parker, be satisfied as a matter of law by warning of dan-
gers not otherwise appreciated. The recognition of such a proposition,
however, is a far cry from a general defense of voluntary assumption of the
risk.
90. Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534 (Tex 1975) (invitee slips and falls on
wet floor).
91. 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978).
92. "Voluntary assumption of risk included and is inseparable from no-duty." Id at
518.
93. Id at 513.
94. 536 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1976).
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In 1967 the supreme court in Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry95 adopted
the principle that an adequate warning to an independent contractor dis-
charges the occupier's duty to employees of that contractor. An employee
of an independent contractor is a special kind of an invitee, and it is doubt-
ful whether the opinion of the supreme court in Parker abolished the
Delhi-Taylor "no-duty" rule. Even so, the issue seems to be one that is
worth reopening in the light of Parker.
III. TORT LAW AND THE MARITAL RELATION
A. The Right of Consortium
When a tortfeasor causes physical harm to one person, the injury will
often adversely affect another. Such indirect or consequential damage to
third persons who are associated, by contract or otherwise, with the injured
person, will sometimes give rise to a separate cause of action. The classes
of persons permitted to recover for losses suffered as a consequence of
physical harm to another have generally been limited to spouses, 96 parents
of minor children, 97 and employers of servants. 98 At early common law, a
husband was entitled to the domestic services of his wife and her earnings
outside the home, and he had a corresponding duty of support.99 Accord-
ingly, when the defendant physically injured or incapacitated the wife, the
husband had a cause of action for loss of services."o This right of recovery
gradually developed into a "right of consortium," which allowed a hus-
band to recover intangible losses commonly referred to as loss of society,
companionship, and sexual relations.'' The wife had no similar right.' °2
As the recognition of equal rights for women increased, so did the pressure
for either recognition of a right of consortium for the wife when the hus-
band was seriously injured 0 3 or denial of the husband's right of consor-
tium. " The entire subject was recently reviewed by the Supreme Court of
California in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 105
Under the Texas community property system, when a spouse is injured,
recovery is allowed by the husband or wife on behalf of the community by
95. 416 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1967).
96. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 125, at 888-91.
97. Id
98. Id. § 129, 938-42.
99. E. KIONKA, TORTS: INJURIES TO PERSONS & PROPERTY 367 (1977). See also 41 AM.
JUR. 2D Husband & W4fe § 9 (1968).
100. Ballard v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 601, 148 N.W.2d 65 (1967);
KIONKA, supra note 99; 41 AM. JUR. 2D, Husband& W!e §§ 449, 450 (1968).
101. Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958), in which
consortium was defined as "the noneconomic aspects of the marriage relation, including
conjugal society, comfort, affection and companionship." 328 P.2d at 449.
102. Id; Hoffman v. Dautel, 192 Kan. 406, 388 P.2d 615 (1964).
103. Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr.
765 (1974).
104. Whitcomb v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 215 Mass. 440, 102 N.E. 663 (1913).
105. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974) (either spouse may bring an
action for loss of consortium caused by negligent or intentional injury to other spouse by
third party).
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resorting to a loss of services theory rather than a loss of consortium."6
The recognition of the right to recover under a loss of services theory un-
doubtedly delayed the supreme court's consideration of whether a right of
consortium exists for the recovery of damage to emotional interests only.
In Wittlesey v. Miller °7 the supreme court recognized that either spouse
has an independent cause of action for loss of consortium as a result of
physical harm caused to the other spouse by the defendant's negligence.
By this ruling, the supreme court has accepted the notion that loss of con-
sortium damages are recoverable for sentimental losses, including loss of
society, companionship, and sexual relations.' The court further held in
Wittlesey that the deprived spouse's consortium action is derivative of the
impaired spouse's cause of action in the sense that liability to the impaired
spouse must first be established. 0 9 Moreover, one could assume that the
deprived spouse's recovery would be diminished by the impaired spouse's
contributory negligence under comparative negligence rules.' "o Loss of
consortium is, however, a separate and independent cause of action and a
release by the impaired spouse of his cause of action does not extinguish
the cause of action of the deprived spouse.'''
B. Interspousal Immunity
Practically all family immunities have been based on the notion that
allowing one family member to sue another for damages caused by alleged
tortious conduct would only disrupt the peace and harmony that would
otherwise exist if the family was left to resolve its disputes. Further, it was
thought that the policy of allocating most, if not all, of the family savings
to a single member of the family would be questionable. In recent years,
however, most courts have perceived that such arguments are not persua-
sive when claims are based on intentional misconduct." 2 Family unity is
usually shattered beyond repair by conduct intended to cause serious bod-
ily injury or death, and the danger of doing injustice to other members of
the household may be outweighed by other considerations. Moreover, it
may not be feasible to distinguish between cases on the basis of the seri-
ousness of the harm intended.
106. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31,
40 n.149 (1972).
107. 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978).
108. Id. at 667. Loss of services remains a valid cause of action brought by the impaired
spouse on behalf of the community.
109. Id at 667.
110. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (damages al-
lowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person
or party recovering).
111. 572 S.W.2d at 669.
112. Many state courts have abolished or restricted family immunities. See Lusby v.
Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (wife sued husband who forced her car off the road
and aided others attempting to rape her); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W.
Va. 1978) (wife sued husband for negligence and for intentional assault). See also Annot.,
43 A.L.R.2d 632, 647-51 (1955); Annot., 40-48 A.L.R.2d LATER CASE SERVICE 332, 338-40
(1969); 40-48 A.L.R.2d LATER CASE SERVICE 172-75 (Supp. 1978).
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The Texas Supreme Court, in Bounds v. Caudle 1 3 abolished inter-
spousal immunity for intentional torts. The case was a wrongful death
action that obviously justified a waiver of interspousal immunity. The
claimants were minor children whose mother was killed intentionally by
their stepfather. Surely, children who suffer a pecuniary loss of great mag-
nitude from the unjustified killing of a parent should not be deprived of a
cause of action because another parent committed the wrongful act.
Perhaps no family immunity ought to survive the legal destruction of the
relationship giving rise to the immunity in the first place.'" " Thus, if di-
vorce follows tortious misconduct, a lawsuit will not disrupt the peace and
harmony of the relationship since it no longer exists. This is not to say that
outright abrogation of family immunities is desirable.' '5 A careful reading
of the New York court of appeals decision in Holodook v. Spencer" 6 dem-
onstrates the wisdom of retaining some limitations on the tort liability of a
parent to a minor child for injuries resulting from negligence in custodial
care. The limited waiver of immunity rule enunciated by the Texas
Supreme Court in Felderhoff v. Felderhoff' " recognizes the need for such
limitations. In Felderhoff the court held the parent liable to the child for
negligence while engaging in furtherance of a business enterprise, but re-
tained the immunity rule "with respect to alleged acts of ordinary negli-
gence which involve a reasonable exercise of parental authority or ...
parental discretion."'' 
8
113. 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1978).
114. Cf. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (one spouse may sue the
other for an intentional tort committed during a legal separation); Goode v. Martinis, 58
Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961) (divorced wife may maintain action against former hus-
band based on tort committed while parties were legally separated, but before divorce de-
cree was final). But see Burns v. Bums, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974) (divorced spouse
may not sue former spouse for negligent tort committed during marriage; leaves open the
question of intentional torts).
115. But see Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978) (interspousal im-
munity totally abolished in West Virginia).
116. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974) (parent may be civilly liable
to a child for tortious breach of duty that is owed apart from family relationship, but not for
breach of a parental duty).
117. 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971).
118. Id. at 933.
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